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THE DEFINABILITY STRENGTH OF COMBINATORIAL
PRINCIPLES
WEI WANG
Abstract. We introduce the definability strength of combinatorial princi-
ples. In terms of definability strength, a combinatorial principle is strong if
solving a corresponding combinatorial problem could help in simplifying the
definition of a definable set. We prove that some consequences of Ramsey’s
Theorem for colorings of pairs could help in simplifying the definitions of some
∆0
2
sets, while some others could not. We also investigate some consequences
of Ramsey’s Theorem for colorings of longer tuples. These results of defin-
ability strength have some interesting consequences in reverse mathematics,
including strengthening of known theorems in a more uniform way and also
new theorems.
1. Introduction
In early ages of reverse mathematics, people found that many classical theorems
in ordinary mathematics, when formulated in second order arithmetic, are equiva-
lent to certain subsystems of second order arithmetic over the Recursive Compre-
hension Axiom (RCA0), in terms of their provability strength. The most prominent
subsystems are the so-called big five: RCA0, WKL0, ACA0, ATR0 and Π
1
1 -CA,
with their provability strength growing strictly stronger from left to right. So the
big five give us a nice ruler, against which the provability strength of many clas-
sical theorems can be precisely measured. But there are exceptions. One of these
exceptions is the instance of Ramsey’s Theorem for 2-colorings of pairs, denoted by
RT22. From Jockusch [10], we can see that every instance of Ramsey’s Theorem is
a consequence of ACA0, the instance for colorings of triples is equivalent to ACA0
over RCA0, but RT
2
2 is not implied by WKL0; later Seetapun [14] proved that RT
2
2
is strictly weaker than ACA0 over RCA0. Since Seetapun’s work, people have found
many propositions in second order arithmetic related more or less to RT22 whose
provability strength cannot be precisely measured by the ruler. People started com-
paring the provability strength of these propositions to each other and have revealed
a very complicated picture. For a general impression of this complicated picture,
we refer the reader to the Reverse Mathematics Zoo (http://rmzoo.uconn.edu/)
maintained by Dzhafarov.
Most propositions in the complicated picture are combinatorial principles and
can be formulated as Π12 sentences, i.e., sentences of the form Φ = (∀X)(∃Y )ϕ(X,Y )
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where ϕ is arithmetic. Given such Φ, each X represents an instance of the corre-
sponding combinatorial problem, and each Y satisfying ϕ(X,Y ) a solution. A pop-
ular and fruitful approach to examine the provability strength of Φ is by analyzing
its computability strength. If for each set W in a certain class of non-computable
sets, there exists a computable Φ-instance X such that every solution Y to the
instance X can code W in some effective way, then we may say that Φ has strong
computability strength in some sense; otherwise, Φ is considered weak. By rela-
tivization, usually we can build an ω-model of a base system (e.g., RCA0) and a
Π12 proposition Ψ with weak computability strength, which does not contain any
solution to a computable instance of another Π12 proposition Φ with strong com-
putability strength. So we conclude that Ψ does not imply Φ over the base system.
The analysis of computability strength is not limited to comparing propositions
with different provability strength, but it can also help us comparing propositions
that have equal provability strength, as shown in [4].
In this paper, we introduce a new kind of analysis, based on what we call the de-
finability strength. Roughly, if Φ is a Π12 sentence then the definability strength of Φ
is measured by whether solving a Φ-instance helps in simplifying certain definability
problem. A formal definition is given in Definition 2.1. Here we mainly apply this
analysis to Π12 propositions in Ramsey theory and also related propositions studied
in reverse mathematics.
As the analysis of computability strength, analyzing the definability strength of
Π12 propositions also leads to consequences in reverse mathematics. We shall present
several results of this kind here. These new results introduce more chaos to the
Reverse Mathematics Zoo. However, they also give us a rather clear classification
of most animals in the Zoo by definability strength. Interestingly, the analysis of
definability strength also yields new proofs of known reverse mathematics theorems,
which were obtained by the analysis of computability strength. Though this new
analysis sounds a little coaser than that of computability strength, it gives some
new proofs in a more uniform way. For example, people have proved several theo-
rems concerning the provability strength of the Ascending or Descending Sequence
principle (ADS), and some of these proofs share little similarity. But through the
analysis of definability strength we obtain new proofs which all depend on the de-
finability strength of ADS. Moreover, as definability appears naturally in various
areas of logic and the new analysis connects combinatorial principles to definability
problems, we believe that this new analysis is interesting in its own right.
Below, we briefly introduce the remaining parts of this paper:
• In §2, we give a formal definition of the center concept of this paper and
prove some general facts which will facilitate our concrete analysis.
• In §3, we study some computability notions and Π12 propositions which are
weak in terms of definability strength.
• In §4, we show that some other Π12 propositions are strong in terms of
definability strength.
• In §5, we conclude this paper with a summarization of the definability
strength results, some consequences in reverse mathematics and a few re-
marks.
We finish this section with a few words on notation and background knowledge.
If s and t are two finite sequences, then we write st for the concatenation of s
and t. If x is a single symbol, then 〈x〉 is the finite sequence with only one symbol
x. The length of a finite sequence s is denoted by |s|. If l < |s| then s ↾ l is the
initial segment of s of length l. For X ⊆ ω, X ↾ l is interpreted as an initial segment
of the characteristic function of X in the obvious way.
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Recall that [X ]r for 0 < r < ω is the set of r-element subsets of X . We also
write [X ]ω for the set of countable subsets of X ; [X ]<r, [X ]≤r, [X ]<ω, [X ]≤ω are
interpreted naturally. If X ⊆ ω, then elements of [X ]≤ω are identified with strictly
increasing sequences. We use σ, τ, . . . for elements of ω<ω. Under the above con-
vention, we may perform both sequence operations and set operations on elements
of [ω]<ω. For example, we can write στ for σ ∪ τ , if σ and τ are in [ω]<ω and
maxσ < min τ ; σ ⊆ τ if σ is a subset of τ ; and σ− τ = {x ∈ σ : x 6∈ τ}. We extend
this convention to infinite subsets of ω, so we write σX for σ∪X , if maxσ < minX
and X ∈ [ω]≤ω. We fix a computable bijection p·q : ω<ω → ω and occasionally
identify σ with pσq. So we may write σ < τ for pσq < pτq, etc.
For two sets X and Y , we write X ⊆∗ Y if X−Y is finite and X =∗ Y if X ⊆∗ Y
and Y ⊆∗ X .
When we work on Ramsey theory, we call a function as a coloring. For a positive
integer c, a c-coloring is a coloring with range contained in c = {0, 1, . . . , c − 1}.
A homogeneous set of a coloring f on [ω]n is a set H such that f is constant on
[H ]n. Ramsey’s Theorem states that for every positive integers c and n > 1 every
c-coloring of [ω]n admits an infinite homogeneous set. RTnc stands for the instance
of Ramsey’s Theorem for fixed n and c. Sometimes it is helpful to consider stable
colorings: a coloring f : [ω]n+1 → ω is stable if limx f(σ〈x〉) exists for all σ ∈ [ω]n.
It is widely understood that computable and recursive are synonymous and so are
computability and recurion theory. Here we prefer computable and computability
in most cases, since computability strength aligns better with its provability and
definability counterparts. However, we prefer primitively recursive to primitively
computable, as the former better indicates the definition both referring to.
For more notions in computability and reverse mathematics, we refer the reader
to Soare [16] and Simpson [15]. We also need some knowledge in algorithmic ran-
domness which can be found in Downey and Hirschfeldt [5]. Furthermore, we
recommend a recent survey paper by Hirschfeldt [7] for a general picture of the
reverse mathematics of Ramsey theory.
2. Preparations
Our center concept is formulated below.
Definition 2.1. A set Y preserves properly Ξ-definitions (relative to X) for Ξ
among ∆0n+1,Π
0
n,Σ
0
n where n > 0, if every properly Ξ (relative to X) set is properly
Ξ relative to Y (X ⊕ Y ). Y preserves the arithmetic hierarchy (relative to X) if Y
preserves Ξ-definitions (relative to X) for all Ξ among ∆0n+1,Π
0
n,Σ
0
n where n > 0.
Suppose that Φ = (∀X)(∃Y )ϕ(X,Y ) and ϕ is arithmetic. Φ admits preservation
of properly Ξ-definitions if for each Z and X ≤T Z there exists Y such that Y
preserves properly Ξ-definitions relative to Z and ϕ(X,Y ) holds. Φ admits preser-
vation of the arithmetic hierarchy if for each Z and X ≤T Z there exists Y such
that Y preserves the arithmetic hierarchy relative to Z and ϕ(X,Y ) holds.
As Ξ-definitions relative to X are trivially Ξ relative to X ⊕ Y , usually we
omit the adverb properly in the above definition and simply say that Y preserves
Ξ-definitions, etc.
If Φ admits preservation of Ξ-definitions then solving Φ-instances does not simply
a properly Ξ-definition. Thus we may classify Φ as a weak proposition. So the above
definition captures our motivation in §1. In the remaining part of this section,
we prove some propositions which will help us in proving preservation and non-
preservation results later.
The first proposition slightly simplies Definition 2.1.
Proposition 2.2. Suppose that n > 0.
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(1) A set Y preserves Σ0n-definitions relative to X if and only if Y preserves
Π0n-definitions relative to X.
(2) If Y preserves ∆0n+1-definitions relative to X then Y preserves Π
0
n-definitions
relative to X.
(3) A set Y preserves ∆0n+1-definitions relative to X if and only if ∆
X
n+1−Σ
X
n ⊆
∆X⊕Yn+1 − Σ
X⊕Y
n .
(4) Let Φ = (∀X)(∃Y )ϕ(X,Y ) with ϕ being arithmetic. If for each X ≤T Z
and for every sequence (Ai : i < ω) with no Ai being Σ
Z
n there exists Y
such that ϕ(X,Y ) holds and no Ai is Σ
Z⊕Y
n , then Φ admits simultaneous
preservation of Σ0n-, Π
0
n- and ∆
0
n+1-definitions.
Proof. (1) follows trivially from that the complement of a ΠXn set is a Σ
X
n set.
For (2), suppose that A ∈ (ΠXn −∆
X
n ) ∩∆
X⊕Y
n . Then A ≤T (X ⊕ Y )
(n−1) and
A ⊕ X(n−1) is of properly computably enumerable degree relative to X(n−1). By
relativizing a construction of Shore (see [16, VI.3.9] or [5, Theorem 8.21.15]), there
exists G ≤T A ⊕ X
(n−1) which is 1-generic relative to X(n−1) and thus n-generic
relative to X . So G is properly ∆Xn+1. But
G ≤T A⊕X
(n−1) ≤T (X ⊕ Y )
(n−1).
Hence G is ∆0n in X ⊕ Y and witnesses that Y does not preserve ∆
0
n+1-definitions
relative to X .
For the only-if part of (3), suppose that Y preserves ∆0n+1-definitions relative
to X . Fix an arbitrary A ∈ ∆Xn+1 − Σ
X
n . Then either A is properly ∆
X
n+1 or
A is properly ΠXn . In the former case A is properly ∆
X⊕Y
n+1 , while in the latter
A is properly ΠX⊕Yn by (2). So in either case, A ∈ ∆
X⊕Y
n+1 − Σ
X⊕Y
n . For the if
part, suppose that ∆Xn+1 − Σ
X
n ⊆ ∆
X⊕Y
n+1 − Σ
X⊕Y
n and A ∈ ∆
X
n+1 − Π
X
n . Then
ω−A ∈ ∆Xn+1−Σ
X
n ⊆ ∆
X⊕Y
n+1 −Σ
X⊕Y
n . Thus A ∈ ∆
X⊕Y
n+1 −Π
X⊕Y
n . So Y preserves
∆0n+1-definitions relative to X .
(4) follows from (1) and (3) and that there are only countable many arithmetic
sets. 
Note that the converse of Proposition 2.2(2) does not hold. For example, a
∆02 1-generic G does not preserve ∆
0
2-definitions but preserves Π
0
1-definitions since
the only computably enumerable sets computable in G is the computable sets.
Furthermore, every low set preserves Π02-definitions. Thus non-preservation of ∆
0
2-
definitions does not imply non-preservation of Π02-definitions.
In the light of Proposition 2.2(4), people may suggest to introduce a notion like
preservation of non-computable-enumerability which sounds stronger than preser-
vation of ∆02 sets. However, preservation of non-computable-enumerability literally
implies that every non-computably-enumerable set is non-computably-enumerable
relative to Y . But a non-computable Y with such a property cannot be computably
enumerable and thus only computable sets preserve non-computable-enumerability.
On the other hand, preservation of the arithmetic hierarchy does not seem admit-
ting an alternative like preservation of non-computable-enumerability.
Next we present a proposition that connects definability strength and com-
putability strength. If ϕ is arithmetic and Φ = (∀X)(∃Y )ϕ(X,Y ) and if for every
Z and X ≤T Z and every countable sequence (Ai : i < ω) of sets not computable
in Z there exists Y such that ϕ(X,Y ) and Ai 6≤T Z ⊕ Y for each i, then we say
that Φ admits simultaneous avoidance of countably many cones.
Proposition 2.3. If Φ is a Π12 sentence that admits simultaneous avoidance of
countably many cones then Φ admits preservation of Σ01- and Π
0
1-definitions.
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Proof. By Proposition 2.2, it suffices to prove the preservation of Π01-definitions.
Suppose that Φ = (∀X)(∃Y )ϕ and ϕ is arithmetic. Fix Z, X ≤T Z and (Ai : i < ω)
such that each Ai is properly Π
Z
1 . Let Y be such that ϕ(X,Y ) and Ai 6≤T Z ⊕ Y .
Then every Ai is properly Π
0
1 in Z ⊕ Y . 
The last proposition of this section shows us how the analysis of definability
strength leads to reverse mathematics consequences. If S is a subset of 2ω and Ξ is
among ∆0n+1,Π
0
n and Σ
0
n, then we write Ξ(S) for the set {A : (∃X ∈ S)(A ∈ Ξ
X)}.
We say that S preserves Ξ-definitions (relative to Z) if every properly Ξ (relative to
Z) set is properly Ξ(S) (Ξ(Z⊕S) where Z⊕S = {Z⊕X : X ∈ S}), and S preserves
the arithmetic hierarchy (relative to Z) if S preserves Ξ-definitions (relative to Z)
for every Ξ among ∆0n+1,Π
0
n,Σ
0
n where n > 0. These notions can be naturally
extended to ω-models.
Proposition 2.4. Suppose that (Φi : i < ω) and Ψ are true Π
1
2 sentences and Ξ is
among ∆0n+1,Π
0
n,Σ
0
n where n > 0.
(1) All Φi admit preservation of Ξ-definitions, if and only if for each Z there
exists an ω-model (ω,S) of RCA0 and
∧
iΦi which contains Z and preserves
Ξ-definitions relative to Z.
(2) If Ψ does not admit preservation of Ξ-definitions, then there exists Z such
that every ω-model (ω,S) of RCA0+Ψ containing Z does not preserve Ξ-
definitions relative to Z.
(3) If every Φi admits preservation of Ξ-definitions but Ψ does not then
RCA0+
∧
i
Φi 6⊢ Ψ.
Conversely, if RCA0+
∧
i Φi ⊢ Ψ and Ψ does not admit preservation of
Ξ-definitions, then some Φi does not admit preservation of Ξ-definitions
either.
Proof. (1) Suppose that Φi = (∀X)(∃Y )ϕi(X,Y ).
For an arbitrary Z, if we have an ω-model (ω,S) as described then for every Φi
and every X ≤T Z we can pick Y ∈ S such that ϕi(X,Y ) holds and Y preserves
Ξ-definitions relative to Z. So every Φi admits preservation of Ξ-definitions.
Conversely, suppose that every Φi admits preservation of Ξ-definitions, then we
can build a sequence ((ω,Sn) : n < ω) such that
• each Sn is of the form {Y : Y ≤T Xn} for some Xn and X0 = Z;
• Xn ≤T Xn+1 and Xn+1 preserves Ξ-definitions relative to Xn;
• for each i and X ∈ Sn there exist m > n and Y ∈ Sm such that ϕi(X,Y ).
Let S =
⋃
n Sn. Then (ω,S) is as desired.
(2) Suppose that Ψ = (∀X)(∃Y )ψ(X,Y ) does not admit preservation of Ξ-
definitions. Then there exist Z and X ≤T Z such that if ψ(X,Y ) then Y does not
preserve Ξ-definitions relative to Z. Hence any (ω,S) |= RCA0+Ψ containing Z is
a desired model.
(3) follows directly from (1) and (2). 
3. Preservations
Recall that our main purpose is to analyze the definability strength of proposi-
tions in Ramsey theory. Here we show that some Π12 propositions are weak in terms
of definability strength. We also show that some computability notions related to
the reverse mathematics of Ramsey theory are also weak.
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3.1. Cohen genericity and randomness. It is not surprising that both Cohen
generic and random reals are weak in terms of definability strength.
Proposition 3.1. If G is sufficiently Cohen generic relative to X then G preserves
the arithmetic hierarchy relative to X.
Proof. We use  for Cohen forcing. Note that {σ ∈ 2<ω : σ  ϕ} is ΣXn if ϕ is Σ
X
n .
Suppose that A 6∈ ΣXn and ϕ is Σ
X
n where n > 0. We claim that the following
set is meager:
S = {Y : (∀i)(i ∈ A↔ ϕ(Y, i))}.
Otherwise, S is comeager in {Y : σ ≺ Y } for some σ ∈ 2<ω. So, A = {i : σ 
ϕ(G, i)}. But then A is ΣXn . Hence if G is sufficiently Cohen generic relative to X
then A 6∈ ΣX⊕Gn .
By Proposition 2.2, G preserves the arithmetic hierarchy relative to X . 
If we carefully examine the above proof then we can obtain the following finer
result. Recall that G is weakly n-generic relative to X if G meets every ΣXn dense
open set of Cantor space (see [5, §2.24]).
Corollary 3.2. If G is weakly (n+1)-generic relative to X then G simultaneously
preserves Π0n-, Σ
0
n- and ∆
0
n+1-definitions relative to X.
Proof. Fix G being weakly (n + 1)-generic relative to X . By Proposition 2.2, it
suffices to show that ∆Xn+1 −Σ
X
n ⊆ ∆
X⊕G
n+1 −Σ
X⊕G
n . Let A ∈ ∆
X
n+1 −Σ
X
n and ϕ be
ΣXn . By the proof of Proposition 3.1, the following set is dense and Σ
X
n+1:
D = {σ : (∃i)((i ∈ A ∧ σ  ¬ϕ(G˙, i)) ∨ (i 6∈ A ∧ σ  ϕ(G˙, i)))}.
So G meets D and A 6= {i : ϕ(G, i)}. 
We apply Proposition 3.1 to a Π12 statement which connects the existence of Co-
hen generic and the reverse mathematics of model theory. Introduced by Hirschfeldt,
Shore and Slaman [9], Π01 G asserts that for every uniformly Π
0
1 sequence (Dn : n <
ω) of dense open sets in Cantor space there exists G ∈
⋂
nDn. It follows immedi-
ately from Proposition 3.1 that:
Corollary 3.3. Π01G admits preservation of the arithmetic hierarchy.
For the next preservation result concerning random reals, we identify R with
Cantor space and denote Lebesgue measure by m. Recall that a real is sufficiently
random if it avoids sufficiently many Lebesgue null sets.
Proposition 3.4. If R is sufficiently random relative to X then R preserves the
arithmetic hierarchy relative to X.
Proof. Suppose that A 6∈ ΣXn and ϕ is Σ
X
n where n > 0. We claim that the following
set is Lebesgue null:
S = {Y : (∀i)(i ∈ A↔ ϕ(Y, i))}.
Otherwise there exists σ ∈ 2<ω such that
m{Y ∈ S : σ ≺ Y } > 2−|σ|−1.
Then
A = {i : m{Y : σ ≺ Y ∧ ϕ(Y ; i)} > 2−|σ|−1},
and A is ΣXn by Kurtz [12, Lemma 2.1a] (see also [5, Lemma 6.8.1]), contradicting
that A 6∈ ΣXn . Hence if R is sufficiently random relative to X then A 6∈ Σ
X⊕R
n .
By Proposition 2.2, R preserves the arithmetic hierarchy relative to X . 
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Similarly, if we examine the effectiveness of the above proof then we can obtain
the finer preservation result below. Recall that a real is weakly n-random if it avoids
every Π0n null set (see [5, §7.2]).
Corollary 3.5. If R is weakly (n+1)-random relative to X then R simultaneously
preserves Σ0n-, Π
0
n- and ∆
0
n-definitions relative to X.
Proof. Fix R being weakly (n+1)-random relative toX . As in the proof of Corollary
3.2, it suffices to show that ∆Xn+1 − Σ
X
n ⊆ ∆
X⊕R
n+1 − Σ
X⊕R
n . Let A ∈ ∆
X
n+1 − Σ
X
n
and ϕ be ΣXn . By the proof of Proposition 3.4, the following set is Π
X
n+1 and null:
S = {Y : (∀i)(i ∈ A↔ ϕ(Y, i))}.
So R 6∈ S and A 6= {i : ϕ(R, i)}. 
From the short proofs above, the reader may have found that the definability of
forcing is a key to preservation.
3.2. Weak Ko¨nig’s Lemma. We devote this section to the proof of the following
preservation theorem for WKL0.
Theorem 3.6. WKL0 admits preservation of the arithmetic hierarchy.
As in the last subsection, we prove the above theorem by proving the definability
of a forcing. We fix an X and an X-computable infinite binary tree T0 and need
to find G ∈ [T0] preserving the arithmetic hierarchy relative to X . As our proof
will be relativizable, we may assume that X is computable. To build G, we build a
sequence of computable trees (Ti : i < ω) such that each Ti+1 is a subtree of Ti, and
then obtain G as a member of
⋂
i[Ti]. We introduce a forcing notion and require
that each Ti is a condition forcing a fragment of the preservation requirement.
Definition 3.7. If T is a computable subtree of 2<ω, then a primitively recursive
subtree S of T is a tree of the form
S = T ∩R
where R is a primitively recursive subset of 2<ω. Let Pr(T ) denote the set of all
primitively recursive subtrees of T . Note that a tree in Pr(T ) could be finite.
Let P be the set of infinite primitively recursive subtrees of T0. A tree in P is a
forcing condition. For S and T in P, S ≤ T if and only if S is a subtree of T .
The following lemma shows that moving from computable trees to primitively
recursive trees costs nothing as long as we concern only the set of infinite paths of
a tree.
Lemma 3.8. For every computable tree S, there exists a primitively recursive tree
T such that [S] = [T ].
Proof. Fix a computable tree S. Let ψ(σ; ~x) be a Σ00 formula such that
S = {σ : (∀~x)¬ψ(σ, ~x)}.
Let
T = {σ : (∀~x)(max ~x < |σ| → ¬ψ(σ, ~x))}.
Then T is a primitively recursive tree and [S] = [T ]. 
So we assume that every computable tree appearing below is primitively recur-
sive. But the main advantage of using primitively recursive trees is that we can
better control the complexity.
Lemma 3.9. Suppose that T ∈ P. Then Pr(T )−P can be identified with a Σ01 set.
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Proof. Fix a computable enumeration (Sn : n < ω) of Pr(T ).
Sn 6∈ P⇔ Sn is finite⇔ (∃m)(∀σ ∈ 2
m)(σ 6∈ Sn).
So Pr(T )− P can be identified with the Σ01 set {n : Sn is finite}. 
We define the forcing relation below. Our forcing language is the first order
language of arithmetic augmented by a unary predicate G.
Definition 3.10. Let T ∈ P.
(1) If ψ(G, ~x) is Σ00, then
T  (∃~x)ψ ⇔ (∃n)(∀σ ∈ 2n ∩ T )(∃~m)(max ~m < n ∧ ψ(σ, ~x)[~m])
and
T  ¬(∃~x)ψ ⇔ (∀σ ∈ T )(∀~n)(max~n < |σ| → ¬ψ(σ, ~x)[~n]).
(2) Suppose that ϕ(G) is not of the above forms.
(a) If ϕ(G) is of the form (∃x)ψ(G;x), then
T  ϕ(G)⇔ (∃n)(T  ψ(G, x)[n]).
(b) If ϕ(G) is of the form ψ ∧ θ then
T  ϕ(G)⇔ T  ψ and T  θ.
(c) If ϕ(G) is of the form ¬ψ(G), then
T  ϕ(G)⇔ S 6 ψ(G) for all S ≤ T,
where S 6 ψ(G) means ¬(S  ψ(G)).
Definition 3.10 appears slightly different from usual forcing definitions. The
difference is introduced for definability purpose. But the next two lemmata show
that this difference is superficial.
Lemma 3.11. For every arithmetic formula ϕ, the following set is dense
{T ∈ P : T  ϕ or T  ¬ϕ}.
Proof. Fix a formula ϕ and a tree T ∈ P.
Suppose that ϕ is of the form (∃~x)ψ and ψ is Σ00. Let
S = {σ ∈ T : (∀~n)(max~n < |σ| → ¬ψ(σ; ~x)[~n])}.
Clearly S is a computable subtree of T . If S is infinite then S  ¬ϕ. If S is finite
then pick σ ∈ T − S such that the following set is infinite:
R = {τ ∈ T : τ is comparable with σ}.
Then R ∈ P and R ≤ T . As σ ∈ T − S, ψ(σ; ~x)[~n] for some ~n with max~n < |σ|. So
R  ϕ.
If ϕ is not Σ01 then the density follows from clause (2c) of Definition 3.10. 
If F is a sufficiently P-generic filter then
⋂
T∈F [T ] contains exactly one real G.
Conversely, from each real H we can define an induced filter F(H) over P as the
trees in P having H as an infinite path. Moreover, if G is the real defined from a
generic filter F as above then F = F(G). So we may say that a real G is sufficiently
generic.
Lemma 3.12. Suppose that G is a sufficiently P-generic. Then for each n > 0
and each Σ0n (Π
0
n) formula ϕ(G), ϕ(G) holds if and only if T  ϕ(G) for some
T ∈ F(G).
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Proof. Suppose that ψ is Σ00 and ϕ = (∃~x)ψ. If ϕ(G) holds then ψ(G; ~x)[~n] holds
for some ~n. Let
T = {σ ∈ T0 : |σ| ≤ max~n ∨ ψ(σ; ~x)[~n]}.
Then G ∈ [T ] and T  ϕ. Conversely, if T ∈ F(G) and T  ϕ then there exist n
and σ ∈ 2n ∩ T such that σ ≺ G and ψ(σ; ~x)[~m] for some ~m. Hence ϕ(G) holds.
Suppose that ψ is Σ00 and ϕ = ¬(∃~x)ψ. If ϕ(G) holds then let
T = {σ ∈ T0 : (∀~n)(max~n < |σ| → ¬ψ(σ; ~x)[~n])}.
Then T ∈ F(G) and T  ϕ. Conversely, if T ∈ F(G) and T  ϕ then ¬ψ(σ; ~x)[~n]
for every σ ≺ G and every ~n with max~n < |σ|. Hence ϕ(G) holds.
Suppose that ϕ is not in above forms. If ϕ is of the form (∃x)ψ then
ϕ(G) holds ⇔ (∃n)(ψ(G;x)[n] holds )
⇔ (∃n)(∃T ∈ F(G))(T  ψ(G;x)[n])
⇔ (∃T ∈ F(G))(T  ϕ(G)),
where the second equivalence is by the induction hypothesis and the last is by clause
(2a) of Definition 3.10.
If ϕ is of the form ψ ∧ θ then
ϕ(G) holds ⇔ ψ(G) and θ(G) hold
⇔ (∃S, T ∈ F(G))(S  ψ and T  θ)
⇔ (∃R ∈ F(G))(R  ϕ(G)),
where the second equivalence is by the induction hypothesis and the last is by
taking R = S ∩ T and clause (2b) of Definition 2.1.
If ϕ is of the form ¬ψ then
ϕ(G) holds ⇔ ψ(G) does not hold
⇔ (∀T ∈ F(G))(T 6 ψ)
By Lemma 3.11 and the genericity of G, the last statement above is equivalent to
the following
T  ¬ψ for some T ∈ F(G).

Next we show that our forcing relation is definable.
Lemma 3.13. If n > 0 and ϕ(G) is a Σ0n (Π
0
n) formula in prenex normal form
then T  ϕ(G) is Σ0n (Π
0
n) predicate for T ∈ P.
Proof. The case where n = 1 follows from clause (1) of Definition 3.10.
Assume that n > 1. For ϕ(G) ∈ Σ0n, the lemma follows from the induction
hypothesis and Definition 3.10(2). Suppose that ϕ(G) is Π0n. Then ϕ(G) is of the
form ¬ψ(G) for some ψ(G) ∈ Σ0n. So,
T  ϕ(G)⇔ S 6 ψ(G) for all S ≤ T
⇔ (∀S ∈ Pr(T ))(S ∈ P→ S 6 ψ(G)).
By the induction hypothesis, S 6 ψ(G) is a Π0n predicate of S. So the last statement
above is a Π0n predicate of T as n > 1 and Pr(T )− P is Σ
0
1 by Lemma 3.9. 
Now we can show that the definability strength of P-generic reals is weak.
Lemma 3.14. If A 6∈ Σ0n (Π
0
n) and ϕ(G, x) ∈ Σ
0
n (Π
0
n) where n > 0, then the set
of T ∈ P satisfying the following property is dense:
(∃n ∈ A)(T  ¬ϕ(G;x)[n]) ∨ (∃n 6∈ A)(T  ϕ(G;x)[n]).
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Proof. Fix T ∈ P. We need to find S ≤ T with
(∃n ∈ A)(S  ¬ϕ(G, x)[n]) ∨ (∃n 6∈ A)(S  ϕ(G, x)[n]).
Firstly, assume that A 6∈ Σ01 and ϕ(G, x) ∈ Σ
0
1. Let
W = {n : (∃l)(∀σ ∈ T ∩ 2l)ϕ(σ, x)[n]}.
Then W ∈ Σ01 and thus W 6= A. Fix n ∈W △A. If n ∈W −A, then let σ ∈ T be
such that ϕ(σ, n) and the following subtree of T is infinite:
S = {τ ∈ T : τ is comparable with σ}.
Then S ≤ T and S  ϕ(G, x)[n]. Suppose that n ∈ A−W . Then let
S = {σ ∈ T : ¬ϕ(σ, x)[n]}.
By Lemma 3.8, we may assume that S ∈ P. Then S  ¬ϕ(G, x)[n].
Assume that n > 1, A 6∈ Σ0n and ϕ(G, x) ∈ Σ
0
n. Let
U = {n : (∃S ≤ T )(S  ϕ(G, x)[n])}.
By Lemmata 3.9 and 3.13, U ∈ Σ0n and thus U 6= A. Fix n ∈ A△U . If n ∈ A−U ,
then S 6 ϕ(G, x)[n] for all S ≤ T . By Definition 3.10, T  ¬ϕ(G, x)[n]. So we can
simply let S = T . If n ∈ U −A, then let S ≤ T be such that S  ϕ(G, x)[n].
Finally, assume that n > 0, A 6∈ Π0n and ϕ(G, x) ∈ Π
0
n. Then ω − A 6∈ Σ
0
n and
ϕ(G, x) is of the form ¬ψ(G, x) for some ψ(G, x) ∈ Σ0n. By the proof above, the
following set is dense
{T ∈ P : (∃n ∈ ω −A)(T  ¬ψ(G, x)[n]) ∨ (∃n 6∈ ω −A)(T  ψ(G, x)[n])}.
Note that if T  ψ(G, x)[n] then T  ¬¬ψ(G, x)[n]. So the above set is contained
in the following set
{T ∈ P : (∃n 6∈ A)(T  ϕ(G, x)[n]) ∨ (∃n ∈ A)(T  ¬ϕ(G, x)[n])}.
This proves the lemma for the last case. 
Theorem 3.6 follows from Lemmata 3.12 and 3.14.
3.3. COH. Recall that a cohesive set for a sequence (An : n < ω) is an infinite set
C such that either C ⊆∗ An or C ⊆∗ ω−An for each n. COH is the assertion that
every sequence of sets has a cohesive set. Cholak et alia [2] introduced COH and
proved that it is a consequence of RCA0 +RT
2
2. Here we prove that COH enjoys a
preservation property.
Theorem 3.15. If ~A = (Ai : i < ω) be Z-computable and (Bi : i < ω) are such that
no Bi is Σ
Z
1 , then there exists an ~A-cohesive set C such that no Bi is Σ
0
1 relative
to Z ⊕ C.
Hence COH admits preservation of ∆02-definitions.
The above theorem follows immediately from a property of Mathias forcing.
Recall that a Mathias condition is a pair (σ,X) ∈ [ω]<ω × [ω]ω such that maxσ <
minX . We identify a Mathias condition (σ,X) with the set below:
{Y ∈ [ω]ω : σ ⊂ Y ⊆ σ ∪X}.
For two Mathias conditions (σ,X) and (τ, Y ), (τ, Y ) ≤M (σ,X) if and only if
(τ, Y ) ⊆ (σ,X) under the above convention.
Lemma 3.16. Let B be a set and (σ,X) be a Mathias condition such that X ≤T Z
and B 6∈ ΣZ1 . Then for every e there exists (τ, Y ) ≤M (σ,X) such that Y =
∗ X
and B 6=WZ⊕Ge for all G ∈ (τ, Y ).
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Proof. Let
W = {n : (∃G ∈ (σ,X))(n ∈ WZ⊕Ge )}.
Then W is ΣZ1 and thus W 6= A.
Fix n ∈ W △ A. If n ∈ W − A then let G ∈ (σ,X) and l > |σ| be such that
n ∈ WZ↾l⊕G↾le and let (τ, Y ) = (G ↾ l, X ∩ (max τ,∞)). If n ∈ A −W then let
(τ, Y ) = (σ,X). 
3.4. Erdo˝s-Moser Principle. A tournament is a binary relation R ⊆ ω × ω
induced by a coloring c : [ω]2 → 2 in the following way:
(c(x, y) = 1→ xRy) ∧ (c(x, y) = 0→ yRx).
A set X is transitive for a tournament R if R ∩X2 is a transitive relation. Erdo˝s-
Moser Principle (EM) is the assertion that every tournament admits an infinite
transitive set.
Theorem 3.17. EM admits preservation of ∆02-definitions.
With Theorem 3.15, we can reduce the above theorem to a preservation property
of a consequence of EM. If R is a tournament such that either (∀∞y)xRy or
(∀∞y)yRx for every x then R is stable. SEM is EM restricted to stable tournaments.
Clearly RCA0 +COH+SEM ⊢ EM. So Theorem 3.17 follows from Proposition 2.4,
Theorem 3.15 and Lemma 3.18 below.
Lemma 3.18. For each Z and a Z-computable stable tournament R and each
sequence (Ai : i < ω) of sets such that Ai 6∈ ΣZ1 for all i, there exists an infinite
R-transitive G such that Ai 6∈ Σ
Z⊕G
1 for all i. So SEM admits preservation of
∆02-definitions.
Below we prove the above lemma. Fix Z, R and (Ai : i < ω) as in the statement
of Lemma 3.18. Without loss of generality, assume that Z is computable. We build
an infinite R-transitive G as desired by Mathias forcing.
Let f : ω → 2 be as follows:
f(x) =
{
0, (∀∞y)(xRy);
1, (∀∞y)(yRx).
By the stability of R, f is total.
A Mathias condition (σ,X) is acceptable, if and only if
(a1) for all x ∈ σ and y ∈ X ,
(f(x) = 0→ xRy) ∧ (f(x) = 1→ yRx);
(a2) σ〈y〉 is R-transitive for all y ∈ X .
To build G, we build a descending sequence of acceptable Mathias conditions.
Note that, if (σ,X) is R-acceptable then
(∀x ∈ X)(∀a, b ∈ σ〈x〉)(aRb → f(a) ≤ f(b)).
In general, if g is an arbitrary 2-coloring of ω, then we say that R and g are
compatible on σ ∈ [ω]<ω if
(∀a, b ∈ σ)(aRb→ g(a) ≤ g(b)).
Lemma 3.19. Let (σ,X) be acceptable. If τ ∈ [X ]<ω is such that στ is R-transitive
and R and f are compatible on στ , then (στ,X∩(n,∞)) is acceptable for sufficiently
large n.
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Proof. Let τ be as above. As στ is R-transitive, we can list elements of στ in
R-ascending order:
a0Ra1R . . . Rak−1,
where k = |στ |. Let
X0 = {x ∈ X : x > max τ ∧ xRa0},
Xi = {x ∈ X : x > max τ ∧ ai−1RxRai}, 0 < i < k,
Xk = {x ∈ X : x > max τ ∧ ak−1Rx}.
By the stability of R and that R and f are compatible on στ , Xi =
∗ X for a unique
i ≤ k. So, στ〈x〉 is R-transitive for all x ∈ Xi. By the definition of Xi, for each
a ∈ στ , if f(a) = 0 then aRx for all x ∈ Xi, otherwise f(a) = 1 and xRa for all
x ∈ Xi. Hence, (στ,Xi) is acceptable. 
So, if we can find sequences satisfying the condition of the above lemma then we
can extend acceptable conditions.
Lemma 3.20. Each acceptable (σ,X) can be extended to an acceptable (τ, Y ) such
that |σ| < |τ | and Y =∗ X.
Proof. Let x = minX . By the remark preceding Lemma 3.19, R and f are com-
patible on σ〈x〉. So, the lemma follows from Lemma 3.19. 
The following density lemma is the key of the proof.
Lemma 3.21. Let (σ,X) be acceptable and (Ai : i < ω) be a sequence of sets such
that Ai 6∈ ΣX1 for all i. Then for every e and every k there exists an acceptable
(τ, Y ) ≤M (σ,X) such that Ai 6∈ ΣY1 for all i and Ak 6= W
G
e for all R-transitive
G ∈ (τ, Y ).
Proof. Let F be the set of g : ω → 2 such that R and g are compatible on σ〈x〉 for
all x ∈ X . Then F can be identified with a ΠX1 class in Cantor space and f ∈ F .
Let W be the set of n such that for every g ∈ F there exists ξ ∈ [X ]<ω satisfying
σξ is R-transitive ∧R and g are compatible on σξ ∧ n ∈ W σξe .
By the compactness of F , W ∈ ΣX1 and thus W 6= Ak. Fix n ∈W △ Ak.
Case 1. n ∈ W − Ak. By the definition of W and that f ∈ F , we can pick
ξ ∈ [X ]<ω such that σξ is R-transitive, R and f are compatible on σξ and n ∈ W σξe .
Apply Lemma 3.19 to (σ,X) and ξ, we can obtain a desired extension (τ, Y ) with
τ = σξ and Y =∗ X .
Case 2. n ∈ Ak −W . Let G be the set of g ∈ F such that
(σξ is R-transitive ∧R and g are compatible on σξ)→ n 6∈W σξe
for all ξ ∈ [X ]<ω. By the preservation property of WKL0 (Theorem 3.6), we
can pick g ∈ G such that Ai 6∈ Σ
X⊕g
1 for all i. If g
−1(0) ∩ X is infinite then let
Y = g−1(0) ∩X , otherwise let Y = g−1(1) ∩X . Thus, Y ≤T X ⊕ g and Ai 6∈ ΣY1
for all i.
Claim 3.22. If ξ ∈ [Y ]<ω then R and g are compatible on σξ.
Proof. It suffices to show that R and g are compatible on arbitrary (a, b) ∈ [σξ]2.
Note that a < b. If a ∈ σ, then R and g are compatible on 〈ab〉 as g ∈ F . If a
and b are both in ξ, then g(a) = g(b) and thus R and g are compatible on 〈ab〉 as
well. 
Hence, if ξ ∈ [Y ]<ω and σξ is R-transitive then n 6∈ W σξe , by the choice of g. So,
(σ, Y ) is a desired extension. 
Lemma 3.18 follows from Lemmata 3.20 and 3.21.
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3.5. Rainbow Ramsey Theorem. From Proposition 3.4 and [3, Theorem 3.1],
we obtain a preservation property of RRT22.
Corollary 3.23. RRT22 admits preservation of the arithmetic hierarchy.
We shall see in Corollary 4.10 that RRTn2 in general does not have the preser-
vation property in the above corollary. But some weaker preservation holds for
RRT32.
Theorem 3.24. RRT32 admits preservation of ∆
0
3-definitions.
To prove the above theorem, we need the following lemmata, which are proved
based on the forcing construction in [18, §3.2 and §4.5]. For the new notions
appeared below, we refer the reader to [18, §3.2 and §4.5]. The first lemma is
an analogous of [18, Theorem 3.4].
Lemma 3.25. Every Z ′-computable ~A = (An : n < ω) admits a cohesive set
preserving ∆03-definitions relative to Z.
Proof. It suffices to show that for every fixed ~B = (Bn : n < ω) with no Bn being
ΣZ2 there exists an ~A-cohesive G such that no Bn is Σ
Z⊕G
2 either. For simplification,
we assume that Z = ∅ and the reader can find that the proof below is relativizable.
We build an infinite binary tree T and a map f : T → [ω]<ω such that
• f is strictly increasing, i.e., if µ is a proper initial segment of ν ∈ T then
f(µ) is a proper initial segment of f(ν), and
• if P ∈ [T ] and G =
⋃
m f(P ↾ m) then G is
~A-cohesive and Bn 6∈ ΣG2 for
every n.
Then we can take G = f(P ) =
⋃
m f(P ↾ m) for any P ∈ [T ]. We use multiple
Mathias conditions of the form ((σµ : µ ∈ I), X) where X is low (so non-Σ02 sets are
exactly non-ΣX2 sets), and build a sequence (pn : n < ω) of decreasing conditions
such that
• each pn = ((σn,µ : µ ∈ In), Xn) and I0 = {∅}, σ0,∅ = ∅ and X0 = ω,
• In 6= In+1 and if µ ∈ In then either µ ∈ In+1 or both µ〈0〉 and µ〈1〉 are in
In+1, and
• if µ ∈ In+1 − In then σn,µ− is a proper initial segment of σn+1,µ where
µ− = µ ↾ (|µ| − 1).
So T =
⋃
n In is an infinite binary tree and f : µ 7→ σn,µ where n = |µ| is a strictly
increasing map from T to [ω]<ω.
Below we build the desired (pn : n < ω). By s-m-n theorem, we fix a computable
function s such that for any C a number n is in the e-th ΣC2 set if and only if
Φs(e,n)(C) is partial where Φi is the i-th oracle Turing machine. For each µ ∈ 2
<ω,
let Aµ =
⋂
µ(i)=1Ai ∩
⋂
µ(i)=0(ω −Ai).
Claim 3.26. Suppose that p = ((σµ : µ ∈ I), X) is (~eµ : µ ∈ I)-large and X is low.
Then for every n and e there exist q = ((τν : ν ∈ J), Y ) and (~dν : ν ∈ J) such that
(1) q is a (~dν : ν ∈ J)-large extension of p and Y is low;
(2) J 6= I and if µ ∈ I then either µ ∈ J or both µ〈0〉 and µ〈1〉 are in J ;
(3) if ν ∈ J extends µ ∈ I then τν − σµ ∈ X ∩ Aµ;
(4) if ν ∈ I ∩J then ~dν = ~eν and for every G ∈ (σν , X ∩Aµ) there exists i ∈ ~eν
with Φi(G) partial;
(5) if ν ∈ J−I then domΦi(τν) > domΦi(σν−) for all i ∈ ~eν− , and for some m
and j = s(e,m) either m ∈ Bn and ~dν = ~eν−〈j〉 or m 6∈ Bn and ~dν = ~eν−
and Φj(G) is partial for each G ∈ (τν , Y ).
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Here we assume that domΦi(σ) = {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1} = m for σ ∈ [ω]<ω. From
the first clause of (5), if p is (~eµ : µ ∈ I)-large and P ∈ [T ] extends µ ∈ I then we
intend to have Φi(f(P )) total for every e ∈ ~eµ, while by the last part of (5) if p
is extended to q and j = s(e,m) 6∈ ~dν then p forces Φj(f(P )) being partial for P
extending ν. So (5) ensures that each Bn is not Σ
0
2 relative to f(P ) for P ∈ [T ].
That T is infinite is guaranteed by (2) and that f(P ) is ~A-cohesive for each P ∈ [T ]
by (3).
Proof of Claim 3.26. For µ ∈ I, let ρµ ∈ [X ∩ Aµ]<ω be such that
(∀i ∈ ~eµ) domΦi(σµρµ) > domΦi(σµ).
Let S be the set of µ ∈ I with ρµ defined, and let J be the set of ν ∈ 2<ω such that
either ν ∈ I − S or ν− ∈ S. Recall that as p is (~eµ : µ ∈ I)-large we intend to force
the totality of Φi(G) for every i ∈ ~eµ and sufficiently generic G ∈ (σµ, X ∩ Aµ).
But if µ ∈ I − S then our intention fails for (σµ, X ∩ Aµ). Nevertheless, by [18,
Lemma 3.8(1)], S 6= ∅ and (2) of the claim holds.
We build a finite descending sequence of extensions qk of p and define q as the
least of this sequence. Firstly we define q0. For each ν ∈ J , if ν ∈ I then let
τ0,ν = σν , otherwise let τ0,ν = σν−ρν− . Pick Y0 ⊆ X such that Y0 =
∗ X and
minY0 > max τ0,ν for all ν ∈ J . Then q0 = ((τ0,ν : ν ∈ J), Y0) ≤∗M p. Let
(~d0,ν : ν ∈ J) be such that ~d0,ν = ~eν if ν ∈ I and ~d0,ν = ~eν− if ν ∈ J − I. Then q0
is (~d0,ν : ν ∈ J)-large, by [18, Lemma 3.8(3)].
Let (νk : k < |J − I|) enumerate J − I. For k < |J − I|, suppose that qk =
((τk,ν : ν ∈ J), Yk) is a (~dk,ν : ν ∈ J)-large extension of p with Yk low. For each
m, append s(e,m) to ~dk,νk in (
~dk,ν : ν ∈ J) and denote the resulted sequence by
(~ck,m,ν : ν ∈ J). Let
W = {m : qk is small for (~ck,m,ν : ν ∈ J)}.
By [18, Definition 3.7], W is Σ02 in Yk and thus Σ
0
2 as Yk is low. As Bn 6∈ Σ
0
2, we
can fix m ∈ Bn △W . We define qk+1 and (~dk+1,ν : ν ∈ J) by case.
Case 1. m ∈ W . By Low Basis Theorem, let (Xi, ~ξi,ν : i < l, ν ∈ J) be an
~A-branching of qk with each Xi low. By the (~dk,ν : ν ∈ J)-largeness of qk and
[18, Lemma 3.8(2)], pick i < l and ξ ∈ ~ξi,νk such that ((τk,ν : ν ∈ J), Xi) is
(~dk,ν : ν ∈ J)-large and
(∃y)(∀ρ ∈ [Xi]
<ω)Φs(e,m)(τk,νkξρ; y) ↑ .
Let (~dk+1,ν : ν ∈ J) = (~dk,ν : ν ∈ J). Replace τk,νk and Yk in qk by τk,νkξ and Xi
respectively and denote the resulted condition by qk+1. Then qk+1 is (~dk+1,ν : ν ∈
J)-large by [18, Lemma 3.8(3)].
Case 2. m ∈ Bn. Let qk+1 = qk and (~dk+1,ν : ν ∈ J) = (~ck,m,ν : ν ∈ J). As
m 6∈W , qk+1 is (~dk+1,ν : ν ∈ J)-large.
Finally, let q = qk and (~dν : ν ∈ J) = (~dk,ν : ν ∈ J) for k = |J − I|. By the
construction above, q and (~dν : ν ∈ J) are as desired. 
Recall that I0 = {∅}. Let ~e0,∅ = ∅. For convenient, all conditions are considered
(~e0,µ : µ ∈ I0)-large. With the above claim, we can define (pn : n < ω) and
(~en,µ : µ ∈ In) such that
• p0 is already defined before Claim 3.26;
• pn+1 ≤∗M pn and pn is (~en,µ : µ ∈ In)-large;
• In 6⊆ In+1 and if µ ∈ In − In+1 then both µ〈0〉 and µ〈1〉 are in In+1;
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• If ν ∈ In+1 extends µ ∈ In then σn+1,ν − σn,µ ∈ Aµ and domΦi(σn+1,ν) >
domΦi(σn,µ) for all i ∈ ~en,µ;
• For each i and e, there exist m and n such that for every µ ∈ In+1 − In
exactly one of the followings holds:
(a) m 6∈ Bi, s(e,m) 6∈ ~en+1,µ and Φs(e,m)(G) is partial for all G ∈
(σn+1,µ, Xn+1),
(b) m ∈ Bi and s(e,m) ∈ ~en+1,µ.
So T =
⋃
n In is an infinite binary tree and f : µ 7→ σn,µ where n = |µ| maps T to
[ω]<ω in a strictly increasing manner. For each P ∈ [T ], f(P ) is ~A-cohesive. For e
and i, let m and n witness the last bullet point above and let U be the e-th ΣG2 set
where G = f(P ). If (a) holds then m ∈ U−Bi; otherwise (b) holds and m ∈ Bi−U
by (5) of Claim 3.26. So no Bi is Σ
G
2 . 
The next lemma is an analogous of [18, Lemma 4.11].
Lemma 3.27. If f : [ω]2 → ω is 2-bounded, stable and Z ′-computable then there
exists an infinite f -rainbow preserving ∆03-definitions relative to Z.
Proof. We present a relativizable proof for Z = ∅. By Proposition 3.4, suffi-
ciently random sets preserve the arithmetic hierarchy, and by [18, Lemma 4.3]
each sufficiently random set computes an infinite Y such that f(u, v) 6= f(x, y) for
(u, v), (x, y) ∈ [Y ]2 with distinct v and y. So by replacing ω with some Y as above
if necessary, we may assume that f(u, v) 6= f(x, y) for all (u, v) and (x, y) with
distinct v and y. Moreover, as in [18, §4.1], we can assume that f(x, y) = 〈w, y〉
where w = min{v : f(v, y) = f(x, y)}.
We construct an infinite f -rainbow G preserving ∆03-definitions by the following
complexity analysis of the forcing argument in [18, §4.5]:
(1) We work with large conditions (σ,X,~h) which are low (i.e., X ⊕ ~h is low);
(2) Observe that it is a Σ02 question whether a large condition p = (σ,X,
~h)
passes an e-test at y (defined after the proof of [18, Lemma 4.16]), if p is
low;
(3) By s-m-n theorem, we fix a computable function s such that for any C a
number n is in the e-th ΣC2 set if and only if Φs(e,n)(C) is partial where Φi
is the i-th oracle Turing machine;
(4) So for a given condition p and an index e, the following set is Σ02 in X ⊕
~h
and thus Σ02 as X ⊕ ~h is low:
W = {y : (∃x)(p passes the s(e, y)-test at x)};
(5) If A 6∈ Σ02 then we can fix y ∈ A△W ;
(6) If y ∈ A−W then p fails the s(y)-test at every x and by [18, Lemma 4.18]
we have Φs(e,y)(G) total for G being sufficiently generic with respect to
large conditions, thus y is not in the e-th ΣG2 set;
(7) If y ∈ W − A then p passes the s(e, y)-test at some x and by [18, Lemma
4.17] we can extend p to q which forces Φs(e,y)(G;x) ↑ for G sufficiently
generic with respect to large conditions and thus y is in the e-th ΣG2 set;
(8) Hence for a list of properly ∆03 sets (Ai : i < ω) by forcing with large
conditions we can obtain an infinite f -rainbow G so that Ai 6∈ ΣG2 for every
i. So G preserves ∆03-definitions.

Proof of Theorem 3.24. Recall that we may identify σ ∈ [ω]<ω with pσq where p·q
is a fixed computable bijection mapping [ω]<ω onto ω.
Fix Z and a Z-computable 2-bounded coloring f : [ω]3 → ω. By passing to an
infinite f -computable subset if necessary, we assume that f(σ〈x〉) 6= f(τ〈y〉) for all
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σ〈x〉, τ〈y〉 ∈ [ω]3 with distinct x and y. As in the proof of Lemma 3.25, we may
assume that
f(σ〈x〉) = min{τ〈x〉 : f(τ〈x〉) = f(σ〈x〉)}
for all σ〈x〉 ∈ [ω]3. Let ~A = (Aσ,τ : σ, τ ∈ [ω]2) be such that
Aσ,τ = {x : f(σ〈x〉) = τ〈x〉}
for each σ, τ ∈ [ω]2. Then ~A ≤T f . By Corollary 3.29 below and that RCA0+RT
2
2 ⊢
COH, let C be an ~A-cohesive set preserving ∆03-definitions relative to Z.
Let g : [C]2 → ω be such that
g(σ) = lim
x∈C
f(σ〈x〉)
for all σ ∈ [C]2. By the cohesiveness of C, g is a well-defined total function. We
may assume that g(x, y) = min{〈i, j〉 : g(i, j) = g(x, y)}. Moreover g ≤T (f ⊕ C)′.
As f is 2-bounded, g is 2-bounded as well. Let ~B = (Bn,x : n < ω, x ∈ C) be such
that
Bn,x = {y ∈ C : g(x, y) = n}.
Then ~B ≤T (f ⊕ C)
′. By Lemma 3.25, let D ∈ [C]ω be ~B-cohesive and preserving
∆03-definitions relative to Z ⊕ C. As C preserves ∆
0
3-definitions relative to Z, so
does C ⊕D.
Let h be g restricted to [D]2. Then h ≤T (f ⊕ C ⊕D)′ and h is 2-bounded and
stable. Apply Lemma 3.27, we get an infinite h-rainbow H which is a subset of D
and preserves ∆03-definitions relative to Z⊕C⊕D. By the definition of h, H is also
a g-rainbow. By the definition of g, Z⊕C⊕D⊕H computes an infinite f -rainbow
G ⊆ H (see the proof of [17, Lemma 3.2]). Thus
∆Z3 − Σ
Z
2 ⊆ ∆
Z
3 − Σ
Z⊕C⊕D
2 ⊆ ∆
Z
3 − Σ
Z⊕C⊕D⊕H
2 ⊆ ∆
Z
3 − Σ
Z⊕G
2 .
So G preserves ∆03-definitions relative to Z. 
3.6. More preservations. We have seen some preservation results that need sub-
stantial proofs. Here we list a few that follow easily from the above preservation
results. Firstly, let us recall some additional notation and consequences of Ramsey’s
Theorem:
• We denote (∀c <∞)RTnc by RT
n and (∀n <∞)RTn by RT.
• An apparently weaker consequence of RTn is the so-calledAchromatic Ram-
sey Theorem (ARTn<∞,d): for every finite coloring f of [ω]
n there exists an
infinite subset H such that f([H ]n) contains at most d many colors.
• For a coloring f : [ω]n → ω, a free set is a set H such that f(σ) 6∈ H − σ
for all σ ∈ [H ]n, and a set G is thin if f([G]n) 6= ω. The Free Set Theorem
(FS) asserts that every f : [ω]n → ω for finite n admits an infinite free set,
and the Thin Set Theorem (TS) asserts that every f : [ω]n → ω for finite
n admits an infinite thin set. Over RCA0, RT implies FS and FS implies
TS ([1]).
Corollary 3.28. The following statements admit preservation of Σ01- and Π
0
1-
definitions: RT2 and its consequences over RCA0, FS and its consequences (e.g.,
TS, RRT) over RCA0, and for each n almost all instances of ART
n
<∞,d.
Proof. By Seetapun [14] and Propositions 2.3 and 2.4, RT2 and its consequences
over RCA0 admit preservation of Σ
0
1- and Π
0
1-definitions. The other preservations
follow from Propositions 2.3 and 2.4 and the author’s work [19]. 
THE DEFINABILITY STRENGTH OF COMBINATORIAL PRINCIPLES 17
By Jockusch [10], there exists a computable f : [ω]3 → 2 such that every infinite
f -homogeneous set computes the halting problem. Hence RTn2 does not admit
preservation of Σ01-definitions for any n > 2.
By an application of Theorem 3.6, we obtain a stronger result for RT2.
Corollary 3.29. If Φ is a Π12 consequence of RCA0+RT
2 then Φ admits preser-
vation of Ξ-definitions simultaneously for all Ξ in {Σ0n+1,Π
0
n+1,∆
0
n+2 : n > 0}.
Proof. By Proposition 2.4, it suffices to prove the corollary for Φ being RT2. Let Z
be fixed and f be a finite coloring of pairs computable in Z. By Theorem 3.6, let P
be such that P is PA over Z ′ and P preserves the arithmetic hierarchy relative to
Z ′. By relativizing the argument in [2, §4], we can obtain an infinite f -homogeneous
set H with (Z ⊕H)′ ≤T P .
Fix Ξ in {Σ0n+1,Π
0
n+1,∆
0
n+2 : n > 0} and a properly Ξ
Z set A. If n > 0 and
Ξ is ΣZn+1 then A is properly Σ
Z′
n . By the choice of P , A is properly Σ
P
n . As
Z ′ ≤T (Z ⊕ H)′ ≤T P , A is properly Σ
(Z⊕H)′
n and thus properly Σ
Z⊕H
n+1 . The
remaining cases of Ξ can be proven similarly. 
However, we shall see in the next section that RT22 does not admit preservation
of ∆02-definitions.
4. Non-preservations
In the last section, we have learned some examples in Ramsey theory and com-
putability that are weak in terms of definability strength. Here we present two
Π12 propositions in Ramsey theory that are relatively strong: one is the so-called
Ascending or Descending Sequence principle and one the Thin Set Theorem.
4.1. Ascending or Descending Sequence. The Ascending or Descending Se-
quence principle (ADS) asserts that every infinite linear order has a infinite as-
cending or descending suborder. A linear order of type a suborder of ω + ω∗ is
called a stable linear order, where ω∗ is the reverse order of ω. The Stable Ascend-
ing or Descending Sequence principle (SADS) is ADS restricted to stable linear
orders. Hirschfeldt and Shore [8] proved that SADS is strictly weaker than ADS
and ADS is strictly weaker than RT22 (over RCA0).
The following theorem is essentially an observation of Jockusch [8, Corollary
2.14].
Theorem 4.1. SADS does not admit preservation of ∆02-definitions.
Proof. By Harizanov [6], we can take a computable stable linear order <L such
that both the ω-part U = {i : (∀∞j)(i <L j)} and the ω∗-part ω − U of <L are
properly ∆02. If S is an infinite <L-ascending sequence then U is Σ
0
1 in S, since
U = {i : (∃j ∈ S)(i <L j)}. Similarly, if S is an infinite <L-descending sequence
then ω−U is Σ01 in S. So SADS does not admit preservation of ∆
0
2-definitions. 
So we obtain a non-preservation property of ADS and RT22 by Proposition 2.4
and the above theorem.
Corollary 4.2. Neither ADS nor RT22 admits preservation of ∆
0
2-definitions.
4.2. Thin Set Theorem. In this subsection we present a non-preservation theo-
rem of TS. Let TSn denote the instance of TS for colorings of [ω]n and let STSn
denote TSn for stable colorings. Clearly, RCA0+TS
n ⊢ STSn.
Theorem 4.3. For each n > 1, there exists a computable stable function f : [ω]n →
ω such that every positive i < n and every infinite f -thin set X correspond to some
B ∈ (∆0i+1−Σ
0
i )∩Σ
X
i . Hence neither STS
n nor TSn admits ∆0i+1-preservation for
any positive i < n.
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The second part of the above theorem follows from the first part and Proposition
2.2. We prove the first part of Theorem 4.3 by induction on n and the following
technical lemma.
Lemma 4.4. Let n > 0 and f¯ : [ω]n → ω be such that
• f¯ is computable in ∅′, and
• if n > 1 then limx f¯(σ, x) exists for all σ ∈ [ω]n−1.
Then there exist f : [ω]n+1 → ω and a sequence of sets (Bi : i < ω) such that
• f is computable and limy f(ξ, y) exists for all ξ ∈ [ω]n,
• if n > 1 and σ ∈ [ω]n−1 then limx limy f(σ, x, y) exists and equals limx f¯(σ, x),
• Bi is ∆02 but not Σ
0
1, and
• if X is infinite and f -thin then Bi ∈ Σ
X
1 for some i.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. By induction on n > 1, we construct a function f which
satisfies Theorem 4.3 and has an additional property that limx f(σ, x) exists for all
σ ∈ [ω]n−1.
For n = 2, let f¯ be any ∅′-computable function on ω. Fix f be as in Lemma 4.4
for f¯ . Then f is as desired.
For n > 2, by relativizating the induction hypothesis we fix a ∅′-computable
f¯ : [ω]n−1 → ω such that
• limx f¯(σ, x) exists for all σ ∈ [ω]
n−2,
• if i < n − 1 is positive and X is an infinite f¯ -thin set then there exists
B ∈ (∆∅
′
i+1 − Σ
∅′
i ) ∩ Σ
∅′⊕X
i .
Apply Lemma 4.4 to get f and (Bi : i < ω) corresponding to f¯ and n− 1. Suppose
that i < n is positive and X is an infinite f -thin set. If i = 1 then Bk ∈ ΣX1 for
some k and thus Bk ∈ (∆
0
i+1 − Σ
0
i ) ∩ Σ
X
i . Assume that i > 1 and k 6∈ f([X ]
n).
Then
lim
y
f(ξ, y) = lim
y∈X
f(ξ, y) 6= k
for all ξ ∈ [X ]n−1 and thus
lim
x
f¯(σ, x) = lim
x
lim
y
f(σ, x, y) = lim
x∈X
lim
y∈X
f(σ, x, y) 6= k
for all σ ∈ [X ]n−2. As f¯ is ∅′-computable, we can find Y ∈ [X ]ω such that Y
is computable in ∅′ ⊕ X and k 6∈ f¯([Y ]n−1). By the choice of f¯ , there exists
B ∈ (∆∅
′
i − Σ
∅′
i−1) ∩ Σ
∅′⊕Y
i−1 . So
B ∈ (∆0i+1 − Σ
0
i ) ∩ Σ
∅′⊕X
i−1 ⊆ (∆
0
i+1 − Σ
0
i ) ∩ Σ
X′
i−1 ⊆ (∆
0
i+1 − Σ
0
i ) ∩ Σ
X
i .
Hence f is as desired. 
To prove Lemma 4.4, we build several objects:
(1) A computable function f : [ω]n+1 → ω as required by the lemma. Let
Ai = {ξ : lims f(ξ, s) = i}.
(2) A computable trinary function g which approximates the sequence (Bi :
i < ω) in the following way: lims g(i, x, s) exists for each (i, x) and no
Bi = {x : lims g(i, x, s) = 1} is Σ01.
(3) A uniformly Σ01 sequence (Ui : i < ω) such that
• if x ∈ Bi then 〈x〉ξ ∈ Ui for all ξ 6∈ Ai with min ξ sufficiently large,
and
• if x 6∈ Bi and 〈x〉ξ ∈ Ui then ξ ∈ Ai.
We guarantee that lims f(ξ, s) exists by ensuring that f(ξ, s) changes at most
finitely often. We apply the same strategy to achieve the existence of lims g(i, x, s).
To achieve limx limy f(σ, x, y) = limx f¯(σ, x) for n > 1 and σ ∈ [ω]n−1, we fix a
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computable approximation (f¯s : s < ω) of f¯ and ensure that f(σ, x, s) = f¯s(σ, x)
for x and s sufficiently large.
To make Bi 6∈ Σ01, we employ a finite injury argument to satisfy the following
requirements:
Ri,j : Bi 6=Wj .
We follow the Friedberg-Muchnik construction to meet a single Ri,j : we pick a
witness for Ri,j , say b, and put it in Bi by defining g(i, b, s) = 1. If b ∈ Wj,t at
stage t > s then we remove b from Bi by defining g(i, b, t) = 0.
To meet the first part of condition (3) above, at each stage s we enumerate 〈b〉ξ
in Ui,s if b < min ξ ≤ max ξ < s, g(i, b, s) = 1 and f(ξ, s) 6= i. However, this action
may cause some problem for the second part of condition (3), since later b could
be removed from Bi for the sake of some Ri,j . To work around this problem, if we
remove b from Bi at stage t > s then we put ξ in Ai by defining f(ξ, t
′) = i for
all t′ ≥ t. Note that at each stage we only enumerate a finite part of Ui. So the
above action defining f(ξ, t) affects at most finitely many ξ. Thus, if n > 1 and
σ ∈ [ω]n−1 then this action causes limy f(σ, x, y) 6= f¯(σ, x) for only finitely many
x. We initialize all Ri′,j′ with lower priorities, so that eventually they will have
witnesses greater than minσ. Thus at later stages Ri′,j′ with lower priority will
not require limy f(σ, x
′, y) 6= f¯(σ, x′) for any x′.
The construction.
Recall that we fix a computable approximation (f¯s : s < ω) of f¯ .
At stage s, if s > 0 then we assume that:
• f is defined on [s]n+1;
• g(i, x, r) is defined for all (i, x) and r < s and if g(i, x, s− 1) = 1 then both
i and x are less than s;
• each Ui,s−1 is finite.
The construction at stage s consists of three parts.
(i) We take care of Ri,j ’s here. A requirement Ri,j requires attention if either of
the following conditions holds:
• Ri,j does not have a witness defined;
• Ri,j has a witness (say b) defined and g(i, b, s− 1) =Wj,s(b) = 1.
Pick the least 〈i, j〉 with Ri,j requiring attention and say that Ri,j receives at-
tention.
Suppose that Ri,j does not have a witness. Perform the following actions:
• let s be its witness and let g(i, s, s) = 1;
• for 〈i′, j′〉 < 〈i, j〉, let g(i′, b, s) = g(i′, b, s − 1) where b is the witness of
Ri′,j′ ;
• proceed to (ii).
Suppose that Ri,j has a witness b defined. Perform the following actions:
• let g(i, b, s) = 0;
• for each 〈i′, j′〉 < 〈i, j〉 and the witness b′ ofRi′,j′ , let g(i′, b′, s) = g(i′, b′, s−
1);
• for each 〈i′, j′〉 > 〈i, j〉 and the witness b′ of Ri′,j′ , let g(i
′, b′, s) = 1 and let
the witness of Ri′,j′ be undefined. In other words, Ri′,j′ is initialized and
it will not have a witness defined until it receives attention again.
(ii) We define f and g.
• If s = 0 then let g(i, x, s) = 0 for all i and x; otherwise, let g(i, x, s) =
g(i, x, s− 1) for each (i, x) such that g(i, x, s) is not defined in (i).
• If ξ ∈ [s]n and 〈b〉ξ ∈ Ui,s−1 for an active witness b of some Ri,j and if
g(i, b, s) = 0, then let f(ξ, s) = i; otherwise let f(ξ, s) = f¯s(ξ).
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(iii) We define Ui,s by
Ui,s = Ui,s−1 ∪ {〈x〉ξ : x < min ξ ≤ max ξ < s, g(i, x, s) = 1, f(ξ, s) 6= i}.
This ends the construction at stage s.
The verification.
Lemma 4.5. Each Ri,j receives attention finitely often and is satisfied.
Note that in this lemma Bi is to be understood as a Σ
0
2 set.
Proof. We prove by induction on 〈i, j〉. Fix 〈i, j〉 and assume that all Ri′,j′ ’s with
〈i′, j′〉 < 〈i, j〉 stop receiving attention after stage s0. We may assume that Ri,j
receives attention and has its witness x = s0 defined at stage s0. As no Ri′,j′ with
〈i′, j′〉 < 〈i, j〉 receives attention after stage s0, Ri,j has its witness b = s0 at all
later stages.
By the construction, g(i, b, s0) = 1. If b 6∈ Wj then Ri,j receives no attention after
stage s0 and is satisfied since Bi(b) = lims g(i, b, s) = 1 6= 0 =Wj(b). Suppose that
Ri,j receives attention again at stage s1 > s0. Then g(i, b, s1 − 1) = Wj,s1 (b) = 1
and g(i, b, s1) = 0. By the construction, Ri,j receives no attention after stage s1
and lims g(i, b, s) = 0 6= 1 =Wj(b), thus Ri,j is satisfied. 
Lemma 4.6. f is well-defined and computable, lims f(ξ, s) exists for all ξ ∈ [ω]n
and if n > 1 then limx lims f(σ, x, s) = limx f¯(σ, x) for all σ ∈ [ω]n−1.
Proof. Suppose that f(ξ, s) 6= f¯s(ξ). Then at stage s there exists Ri,j such that
Ri,j has an active witness b, 〈b〉ξ ∈ Ui,s−1 and g(i, b, s) = 0. By (i) and (iii) of
the construction, there exists s0 ≤ s with g(i, b, s0 − 1) = 1 6= 0 = g(i, b, s0) and
〈b〉ξ ∈ Us0−1. At stage s0, Ri,j receives attention and all Ri′,j′ ’s with 〈i
′, j′〉 > 〈i, j〉
are initialized. So at any stage t ≥ s0, Ri′,j′ with 〈i′, j′〉 cannot have an active
witness b′ < min ξ. It follows that at stage s the above Ri,j is unique. Hence f is
well-defined. The construction guarantees that f is computable.
To prove the existence of lims f(ξ, s), pick a stage s such that no Ri,j with a
witness less than min ξ receives attention after stage s. At every stage t > s, either
there exists exactly one fixed Ri,j with an active witness b such that 〈b〉ξ ∈ Ui,t,
or there is no such Ri,j . In the former case lims f(ξ, s) = i and in the latter
lims f(ξ, s) = lims f¯s(ξ) = f¯(ξ).
Suppose that n > 1, σ ∈ [ω]n−1 and f(σ, x, s1) 6= f¯s1(σ, x). Then there is exactly
one Ri,j with an active witness b such that 〈b〉σ〈x〉 ∈ Ui,s1−1 and g(i, b, s1) = 0.
Let s0 ≤ s1 be the stage such that g(i, b, s0 − 1) = 1 and g(i, b, s0) = 0 and
〈b〉σ〈x〉 ∈ Ui,s0−1. Then Ri,j receives attention and all Ri′,j′ with 〈i
′, j′〉 > 〈i, j〉
are initialized at stage s0. So at any stage t > s0, if 〈i′, j′〉 > 〈i, j〉 and Ri′,j′ has
an active witness b′ then b′ > max σ and thus there exists no 〈b′〉σ〈x′〉 ∈ Ui′,t. It
follows that lims f(σ, x, s) 6= f¯(σ, x) for at most finitely many x. As limx f¯(σ, x)
exists, limx lims f(σ, x, s) = limx f¯(σ, x). 
Lemma 4.7. g is computable and stable.
Proof. By the construction, g(i, x, s−1) 6= g(i, x, s) happens only if at stage s some
Ri,j with an active witness b ≤ x receives attention. But there are at most finitely
many Ri,j ’s having witnesses not greater than x. So we can pick a stage t such
that no Ri,j with an active witness b ≤ x receives attention after stage t. Then
g(i, x, t) = lims g(i, x, s). 
Recall that Ai = {ξ : lims f(ξ, s) = i}.
Lemma 4.8. For each i, if b ∈ Bi then 〈b〉ξ ∈ Ui for all ξ 6∈ Ai with min ξ
sufficiently large, and if b 6∈ Bi and 〈b〉ξ ∈ Ui then ξ ∈ Ai.
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Proof. It follows from (iii) of the construction at each stage and the stability of f
and g that if b ∈ Bi then 〈b〉ξ ∈ Ui for all ξ 6∈ Ai with min ξ > b.
Suppose that b 6∈ Bi and 〈b〉ξ ∈ Ui. By the construction of Ui, there is a stage
s0 such that g(i, b, s0) = 1 and f(ξ, s0) 6= i. As b 6∈ Bi, there is a stage s1 > s0 such
that g(i, b, s1− 1) = 1 and g(i, b, s1) = 0. By (i) of the construction at stage s1, b is
the active witness of some Ri,j , Ri,j receives attention at stage s1 and f(ξ, s1) = i.
If some Ri′,j′ with 〈i′, j′〉 < 〈i, j〉 receives attention at a stage s > s1 then
g(i, b, s) = 1 and b cannot become an active witness for any requirement at any
stage t > s. By (ii) of the construction, b ∈ Bi, contradicting our choice of b. So
Ri,j is not initialized after stage s1 and g(i, b, s) = 0 for any s ≥ s1. By (ii) of
the construction, f(ξ, s) = i at every stage s > s1. Hence lims f(ξ, s) = i and
ξ ∈ Ai. 
It follows from Lemma 4.6 that f is as desired. By Lemmata 4.7 and 4.5,
Bi = {x : lims g(i, x, s) = 1}’s yield a uniformly ∆02 sequence (Bi : i < ω) with each
member not in Σ01. If X is an infinite f -thin set then i 6∈ f([X ]
n+1) for some i and
thus Bi ∈ ΣX1 by Lemma 4.8. So we have proven Lemma 4.4.
Corollary 4.9. If n > 1 then FSn does not admit preservation of ∆0i+1-definitions
for any positive i < n.
Proof. By Cholak et al. [1, Theorem 3.2], RCA0+FS
n ⊢ TSn. So the corollary
follows from Proposition 2.4 and Theorem 4.3. 
Recently in private communications, Patey showed that RCA0+RRT
2n+1
2 ⊢
STSn+1 for n > 0. So the definability strength of RRT2n+12 for n > 0 is strictly
stronger than that of RRT22.
Corollary 4.10. For n > 0, RRT2n+12 does not admit preservation of ∆
0
i+1-
definitions for any positive i ≤ n.
5. Conclusion
We summarize the known preservations and non-preservations in Table 1 with
references in parenthese. For simplification, we omit some easy consequences of the
results in Table 1. For example, it is omitted that RT22 does not admit preservation
of ∆02-definitions (Corollary 4.2).
From Table 1 and Proposition 2.4, we can derive some consequences about prov-
ability strength. We present two examples here. The first is by examining the
preservations and non-preservations of ∆02-definitions.
Theorem 5.1. Let Φ be the conjunction of COH, WKL0, RRT
2
2, Π
0
1G and EM.
Over RCA0, Φ does not imply any of SADS, STS
2, TS2 and FS2.
Theorem 5.1 strengthens the following known results: RCA0+COH+WKL0 6⊢
SADS (Hirschfeldt and Shore [8]), RCA0+Π
0
1G 6⊢ SADS (Hirschfeldt, Shore and
Slaman [9]), RCA0+RRT
2
2 6⊢ SADS (Csima and Mileti [3]), RCA0+RRT
2
2 6⊢ TS
2
(Kang [11]), RCA0+EM 6⊢ SADS (Lerman, Solomon and Towsner [13]), and
RCA0+EM 6⊢ STS
2 (Patey, unpublished). But the approach here is more uni-
form. Moreover, Proposition 2.4 allows us to stack Π12 propositions with weak
definability strength together. This is another advantage of our approach.
The next example follows from the ∆03 row of Table 1.
Theorem 5.2. Over RCA0, RRT
3
2 does not imply any of STS
3,TS3,FS3.
Yet there are questions around Table 1. From Proposition 2.4 and the ∆02 row of
the table, we can derive an almost complete classification of well-known Π12 propo-
sitions below ACA0. However, we know just a little at rows above ∆
0
2. Moreover,
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Preservations Non-preservations
Arithmetic Hierarchy Cohen generics (3.1)
random reals (3.4)
Π01G (3.3)
WKL0 (3.6)
RRT22 (3.23)
Σ0i+1,Π
0
i+1,∆
0
i+2 (i > 0) RT
2 (3.29)
∆0i+1 (0 < i ≤ n, n > 0) STS
n+1 (4.3)
RRT2n+12 (n > 0, 4.10)
∆03 RRT
3
2 (3.24)
∆02 COH (3.15) SADS (4.1)
EM (3.17)
Σ01,Π
0
1 RT
2
2,FS,ART
n
<∞,d (3.28) RT
n
2 (n > 2, [10])
Table 1. Preservations and Non-preservations
there is an interesting phenomenon: for either COH or EM, we prove that each
admits preservation of ∆02-definitions and preservation of definitions beyond the
∆02 level (implied by that of RT
2
2). So it is natural to conjecture that these two
preservations can be combined for both COH and EM.
Conjecture 5.3. Both COH and EM admit preservation of the arithmetic hierar-
chy.
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